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The Public’s Interest in the O’Fallon Decision
By L. D. McPherson

Did the supreme court of the United States in its recent opinion
in the O’Fallon case, which was a test case on railroad valuation,
decide “ the greatest lawsuit in history ” ? It had been thought in
many quarters that valuation of railroads would give rise to “the
greatest lawsuit in history,” and the O’Fallon case, which was
started in 1924, has been generally discussed as such a case because
it involved principles for the determination of railroad values and
operating income applicable to all roads. The O’Fallon decision
held that the valuation order made by the interstate commerce
commission must be vacated because no consideration had been
given the present cost to reproduce the railroad as required by
the act of congress and the law of the land. The decision did
not indicate the weight that should be given such cost in deter
mining value, but indicated that there were, perhaps, many rail
roads which should be valued far below their present reproduction
cost. As previous decisions had been consistent with this one,
the public had generally discounted the probable effect of it as
rendered. The extent to which the general public may be affected,
favorably or adversely, by the decision may be best estimated
by enumeration of some of the interests involved.
EFFECTS OF THE DECISION

Rates will not be increased because of the decision—certainly
not for several years, or until valuations are finished. Some claim
that the cost of most railroad property has increased about 85 per
cent.; others, that the net increase is not more than 40 per cent.
Under these views the maximum increase in rates that the decision
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could possibly effect would be from 5 to 10 per cent. Therefore,
this decision could not dominantly influence changes in rates.
The “prudent investment” theory used by the commission in
the O’Fallon case failed to receive the approval of the supreme
court. In applying this theory the commission priced and de
preciated railroad property which had been installed prior to the
late war without first enhancing its cost for subsequent increases
in prices. All property added later was considered at actual cost.
The decision should result in cheaper discount and brokerage
commissions for underwriting the sale of railroad securities,
because of the reassurance investors receive.
Prosperous railroads, according to the principles upheld, may
be relieved, to a substantial extent, of paying to the government
one half of their net railway-operating income in excess of 6 per
cent. on the value of their property. They are relieved of interest
on such income until its amount is determined.
There will be continuation, for several years at least, of the
high expense to the public (so far about $155,000,000), in federal
taxes and transportation rates, of administering the valuation
and transportation acts, but even though these expenses seem
high, there are important uses to be made of the railroad valua
tions, including regulation of rates, security issues, depreciation,
accounting, consolidations and recovery of excess railway-operat
ing income.
The decision may clarify economic thought as to the reasons,
if any, for differences in valuations for rate regulation, recapture,
financing, consolidations and taxation.
DECISION MAY AFFECT VALUATION

Legislation will doubtless be advocated on behalf of the public
to build extensions to national highway systems to provide com
petition to the railroads. An effort will be made to eliminate as
arbitrary, fictitious and uneconomic some provisions of the inter
state commerce act and to propose instead a principle which
allows railroads a fair return for the services rendered the public.
A repeal of the provisions for finding or considering reproduction
cost in fixing railroad values will probably be sought.
The repeal would not accomplish its object as long as the
established interpretation of the constitution is followed. Similar
laws have been held void as an invasion by the legislative branch
of government into the separate and exclusive domain of the
322
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judiciary. If legislation of the type suggested is advocated, the
railroads may propose amendments to permit determination of
their net railway-operating income as an average over a reason
able period of lean as well as prosperous years, instead of for a
a single year.
The railroads may find it difficult to assemble conclusive
proof of current or reproductive costs for even the major por
tions of their property. If the data are available, the serious
problem of qualifying them as proof of an accurate measure of
such cost still remains. The railroads may have to prove that
all their facilities are a present necessity and convenience of
the transportation plant; that they are efficient, economical and
adaptable to transportation needs. If such a showing were
made by railroads, the bureau of valuation of the commission,
or interveners, might prove the contrary by the data taken from
the numerous and frequent reports made by the railroads to the
commission and other governmental agencies. These data may
include a wealth of statistics as to such features as ill advised
location, uneconomic grades and curvature, obsolescence in
equipment, bridges, tunnels, shops and other buildings and struc
tures, the shifting of traffic to competing forms of transporta
tion and the probable cost of substituting for the railroad a more
economical and efficient plant which would be capable of render
ing the required service. On such showings, conflict in evidence
might be so great that doubts might be resolved by the commis
sion against the railroads. If the members of the commission
agreed, and recited in the valuation order that it had duly consid
ered all evidence before it, it would be difficult for a railroad to
reverse that order in court, even in a case where confiscation of
property was alleged to result. Strength for such a disposition
of the evidence by the commission is found in the regulation under
which the renewal or replacement of railroad property as it is
exhausted, damaged or retired from service is paid for as a current
railway-operating expense. As prices advanced the increased
cost of such renewals as are found in the present-day railroad
would properly have been paid for at these advanced prices from
the rates collected for service. If rates collectable have not been
adequate to pay the advances in the costs of renewals plus a
just contribution to depreciation reserves and a fair return on
the value of the railway, the failure of the management to collect
sufficient rates may have been due to economic causes. If the
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owners, by waiving a fair return, have borne some or all of the
higher costs of renewals there is more equity in the demand for
rates to yield a return on the property valued at the present ad
vanced cost of reproduction. If not, the payment of the higher
costs by the rate-payers shifts to the owners the burden of proving
that this is not a duplication of charges.
INCREASED RAILROAD VALUATION STIMULATES OTHER FORMS OF

COMPETITION

The value of railroad property is not insensible to competition
which has been fostered by federal government aids to shipping
through the opening and operation of the Panama Canal, through
intercoastal and inland waterway development and harbor im
provements, and through the building of highways of more than
one third the length of all main-line railway mileage. Such
automobile highways connect with other systems and constitute
altogether a mileage of three fourths the full length of all railway
main-line mileage. Motor-bus, motor-truck and private-passen
ger-automobile operation on these highways has depressed the
rates and volume of railroad passenger traffic, express, and package
and less-than-car-load freight, even for long distances. The high
ways carry much freight that formerly went in car loads. Some
applications have been granted to reduce passenger train fares
as much as one half. The commission annually grants numerous
petitions by railroads for reduction in service and abandonment
of lines. This causes some compensation to the railroads, as the
local trains discontinued and the lines abandoned were generally
unprofitable before competition on the highways was effective.
However, full consideration of all problems of highway transpor
tation raises a doubt that it will increase further as competition
to railroads.
Pipe-line construction has also provided considerable competi
tion to the railroads. Competition between rail and water car
riers at many points depresses rates to those common points.
To avoid discrimination, which is forbidden by law, charges for
shorter hauls to stations between these common points generally
can not be higher than for the longer haul to the competitive
points. This alone has tended to depress rates at nearly all
stations. Other laws defeat possible economies in transportation,
such as "full train crew” laws which put unnecessary employees
on some trains, and franchises, ordinances, contracts, etc., which
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regulate or interfere with the speed of operation, with station
stops and with the abandonment of locations for roadway, sta
tions, shops, etc., which are no longer useful.
On valuation questions many railroad labor unions opposed
the claims of the owners. Their opposition was apparently based
on the idea that the less the owners took out of the revenue, the
more there would be for the workers.
RAILROAD VALUES LESSENED

Changes in conditions due to science and progress apparently had
not been taken fully into account by the commission and were dealt
with in the majority opinion in the O’Fallon decision only by in
ference. In a dissenting opinion emphasis is laid upon the extent
and effect of obsolescence in decreasing the value of railroad
property. Most railroads, including many trunk lines, operate
over grades which were economical only for the traffic and equip
ment of a generation or two ago. On the other hand, the great
amount of modern equipment and facilities which has been sub
stituted for obsolete property by the railroads within the past few
years has increased the net revenue. Investments for these im
provements were commended in the dissenting opinion in the
O’Fallon case. These improved facilities were the means of
eliminating nearly one seventh of the number of employees
previously required, and the dissenting opinion indicates that
much further economy of operation might be effected by retire
ment of substantial quantities of obsolete facilities still in
service.
While under the decision the commission can justify a failure to
value a railroad at or near the current cost of reproduction, a
valuation at less than such cost might not be justified solely on
estimated net reductions to be effected in the cost of transporta
tion by substituting the most modern facilities. It might be
justified if it were shown that in the operation of modern equip
ment at or near its capacity over a roadway modernized to meet
its requirements transportation expenses would be reduced
enough to pay the increase in fixed charges for financing the im
provements. Such expensive betterments should be required by
traffic which has outgrown existing facilities before the latter
should be depreciated for obsolescence.
While foreclosure prices are not close criteria of the value of
railroads, the disparity between the present cost of reproduction
325
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and the upset or sale price is nearly always great enough to sug
gest caution in the use of such cost as a measure of value. A
railroad or a branch or division thereof which would not be useful
in consolidations and for which honest, economical and efficient
management over a reasonable period of normal years can show
no net earnings or other results of operation beneficial to owners,
is worth little, if anything, more than salvage value. Railroad
construction that was ill advised, lines which have been built for
traffic which has been exhausted and lines which are unable to
hold sufficient remunerative traffic against modern competitive
forms of transportation constitute considerable railroad mileage
which should be abandoned.
Much wasteful transportation would be avoided by a discon
tinuation of service over such lines. The success of local interests
in delaying the abandonment of such railroads is not generally
merited by transportation necessity. The abandonment of
main-line mileage within the past 15 years has greatly exceeded
the mileage of new construction. Much information as to cause,
extent and progress of obsolescence in railroad property has been
accumulated with the increasingly numerous applications filed
with the commission for the privilege of abandoning railroads or
reducing service.
These strong reminders of the blight of obsolescence in railroad
facilities may be expected to affect the judgment of the commission
in fixing the actual value of the railroads for the purposes of
rate-making and recapture.
PUBLIC AS A SECURITY OWNER BENEFITED

A benefit to the investing public is the effect of the O’Fallon
decision to discourage rate reductions. The increased diffusion of
railroad securities among the general public since the valuation
was begun has created an interest in supporting higher valuations.
Interlocked with the interest of these investors is the indirect in
terest of the great multitude in all occupations and stations in
life which is substantially affected by dividends received from
mutual insurance companies, savings banks, trust companies, etc.,
having large holdings in railroad securities.
The commission is not so limited by the decision that it must
ignore a railroad’s financial structure. If it did this and relied
exclusively or largely on the current cost of reproduction as the
measure of a railroad’s ultimate value it would enable stockhold326
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ers who carried the smaller risk to receive the greater profit.
The borrowers receive all the benefit of an increased valuation,
the lenders, little. As an incident to the commission’s wholeproblem of regulation of railroads it can mitigate the burden on
rates from an increased valuation by reducing the rate of return
heretofore established by it as fair. It has changed the rate to
5^4 per cent. If it should find that 4 3/4 per cent. would attract
the capital needed by railroads when valued at current repro
duction cost the loss of 1 per cent. would annul approximately
one fourth of the gain from the increases in the parts of the
railway value due to changed costs. Practically, such reduced
rate of return might be difficult for the commission to sustain in
view of the findings by an eminent economist that a rate of 61/2
per cent. had necessarily been paid to attract capital required by
twenty-four representative railroads having established credit.
PRESENT TAXES AFFECT RATES MORE THAN THE DECISION

The O’Fallon decision is not as apt to be the cause of an in
crease in rates as the taxes now collected, since railway taxes have
an important bearing on rates. An increase in valuation due toincreased cost of reproduction or other cause would be promptly
used as a basis for increasing railroad taxes. Increases in rail
road taxes from 1913 to 1928 consumed more than one half of the
net revenue derived from the shipments of the principal products
of the soil of the representative agricultural sections of the coun
try. Within this time taxes on a typical railroad system increased
to nearly four times as much as they previously were, and now
consume approximately one half of all gross passenger revenue..
RATES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE INCREASED

The chief concern of the public is the effect of the decision on
future rates, although there is no indication that the railroads
intend to use it as a foundation for wholesale upward revision of
rates. No one wishes to establish rates so high that they will
check production or transportation of goods or retard the pros
perity of the territory served.
It is rather to the interest of all railroads to attract new and
regain lost traffic. About twenty years ago the United States
supreme court decided that it was the duty of public-utility
managements to collect rates that would pay a fair return on the
property used in the service and would provide the cost of re327
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placement of items of property when their usefulness was ex
hausted in service. The managements of many public utilities
could not fully enforce this right. Others would not attempt it.
The decision in the O’Fallon case is even a less definite and posi
tive grant of power to public-utility managements. Rates high
enough to pay a fair return on the current cost of reproduction of
all railroads are not likely to be enforced now for the same or
equally good reasons. Railroads make their money out of the
growth of gross earnings over a long period (heretofore averaging
about four per cent. per annum) and by their ability to reduce
operating expenses. These considerations indicate that rates
should gradually decline. Significant among the economies for
merly available to railroads, but realized more fully in recent
years, are the savings in rentals paid by one railroad on the cars of
another. Floodlights in freight yards permit operation for
twenty-four hours every day and this has greatly increased the
mileage per diem of cars and locomotives. The reduced number
of cars required for the larger volume of freight avoided the
consequences of car shortages. Mileage between locomotive
terminals has also been greatly increased.
One analysis of the effect of the O’Fallon decision on railroad
rates, if reproduction costs are taken as the sole measure of the
value of railroad property, shows that the probable increase in
rates required would range between 5 and 10 per cent., the varia
tions being due to differences in conclusions regarding the real in
crease in costs. This estimate is made from calculations in which
the commission’s tentative valuation of all railroads as of 1920
was the basic figure. From this latter figure deductions were
made for land, working capital and intangibles to obtain the
amount which represented that part of the property which would
be affected by the fluctuations in costs which were in controversy
in the O’Fallon case. This fluctuating part of the railroad cost
was raised to current cost by multiplying by index numbers.
Non-depreciable property included in this new cost was deducted
to obtain the sum to be depreciated, from which depreciation was
deducted. To the present cost of such fluctuating property,
depreciated, were added intangibles, working capital, additions
and betterments (since 1920) and non-depreciable property,
including land, to obtain the ultimate value by giving full weight
to increased costs. A return at the rate of 5^ per cent. on this
ultimate value was computed. It produces a sum to provide
328
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which at a conservative estimate would require payment of rates
from 5 to 10 per cent, higher than those collected in 1928.
General increases to this extent in all rates would be difficult
to effect in periods of comparative economic stability. As a
result of the general disturbance in prices incident to the world
war the commission in 1920 increased freight rates from 25 per
cent. to 40 per cent., and passenger rates 20 per cent. following a
previous increase of 40 per cent. Business did not then readily
adjust itself to such great changes. Gross revenue rose in 1921,
varying from 59 per cent. to 96 per cent. Reductions were sought
by both shippers and travellers, and to a considerable extent by
railroads. In 1921 rates on farm products were reduced 10 per
cent. or more. In 1922 the commission ordered a general reduc
tion on all other freight amounting to 10 per cent. Further
reductions in 1923 lowered rates approximately 5 per cent.
more. Lowering of railroad revenue per ton-mile and per passen
ger-mile has since continued from year to year. These reductions
occurred because of actual or potential competition, despite the
commission’s recognition of its obligation under the law to estab
lish remunerative rates and its denial of many railroads’ applica
tions for permission to reduce rates substantially.
The influence of the O’Fallon decision may be relegated to a
minor place by the unavoidable lapse of time before the commis
sion can make ultimate valuation of the railroads. Or its
influence may be minimized by increased economies in transpor
tation by railroads and their competitors; by other economic
causes including the shifting of general price levels and cost of
railroad construction and equipment; by changes in the laws
or their administration, or by railroad labor agreements.
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